

LECTURE 15

Plan: 1) LINEAR PROGRAMMING

1) DUALITY

2) ZERO SUM GAMES

RECAP:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximize} \quad & 5x + 4y \\ \text{Subject to} \quad & 2x + 3y \leq 10 \\ & x + 2y \leq 20 \\ & x \leq 7 \\ & x, y \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Feasible point :

Feasible region :

Optimum :

EDGE CASES

$$\text{Maximise } 2x + 3y$$

$$x + y \leq 10$$

$$x \geq 6$$

$$y \geq 6$$

$$\text{Maximise } 2x + 3y$$

$$x \leq 10$$

WRITING LINEAR PROGRAMS WITH MATRICES

Variables: $x_1, \dots, x_n \in \mathbb{R}^n$

Constraints:

$$a_{11}x_1 + a_{12}x_2 + \dots + a_{1n}x_n$$

$$a_{21}x_1 + a_{22}x_2 + \dots + a_{2n}x_n$$

⋮

$$a_{m1}x_1 + a_{m2}x_2 + \dots + a_{mn}x_n$$

$$< b_1$$

$$\leq b_2$$

$$\leq b_m$$

$$A \cdot x$$

$$\leq b$$

Maximise $C_1x_1 + C_2x_2 + \dots + C_nx_n$

$$C^T x$$

LP DUALITY

$$2x_1 + x_2 \leq 100$$

$$x_1 \leq 30$$

$$x_2 \leq 60$$

$x_1 \geq 0$
$x_2 \geq 0$

$$5x_1 + 4x_2 \leq 5 \cdot 30 + 4 \cdot 60 = 390$$

Maximize $5x_1 + 4x_2$

$$\underline{\underline{\text{OPT} \leq 390}}$$

UPPER BOUNDS

$$(2x_1 + x_2 \leq 100) \cdot 3$$

$$(x_1 \leq 30) \cdot 0 +$$

$$(x_2 \leq 60) \cdot 1$$

$$x_1 \geq 0$$

$$x_2 \geq 0$$

$$6x_1 + 4x_2 \leq 3 \cdot 100 + 60 = 360$$

Maximize

$$5x_1 + 4x_2$$

$$\text{OPT} \leq 360$$

$$(2x_1 + x_2 \leq 100) \cdot 5/2$$

$$(x_1 \leq 30) \cdot 0$$

$$(x_2 \leq 60) \cdot 3/2$$

$$x_1 \geq 0$$

$$x_2 \geq 0$$

$$5x_1 + 4x_2 \leq (100) \cdot 5/2 + 60 \cdot (3/2)$$

Maximize

$$5x_1 + 4x_2$$

$$= 340$$

$$\text{OPT} \leq 340$$

LP (PRIMAL)

$$\begin{cases} 2x_1 + x_2 \leq 100 \\ x_1 \leq 30 \end{cases} \cdot y_1$$

$$x_1 \geq 0$$

$$\begin{cases} x_2 \leq 60 \end{cases} \cdot y_3$$

$$x_2 \geq 0$$

$$(2y_1 + y_2) \cdot x_1 + (y_1 + y_3) \cdot x_2 \leq 100y_1 + 30y_2 + 60y_3$$

Maximize

$$5x_1 + 4x_2$$

LP*
(DUAL)

Minimize

$$100y_1 + 30y_2 + 60y_3$$

$$y_1, y_2, y_3 \geq 0$$

$$2y_1 + 1 \cdot y_2 + 0 \cdot y_3 \geq 5$$

$$1 \cdot y_1 + 0 \cdot y_2 + 1 \cdot y_3 \geq 4$$

$$5x_1 + 4x_2 \leq (2y_1 + y_2)x_1 + (y_1 + y_3)x_2$$

$$\leq 100y_1 + 30y_2 + 60y_3$$

PRIMAL LP (Maximization)

$$\begin{bmatrix} A \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} x \end{bmatrix} \leq \begin{bmatrix} b \end{bmatrix}$$

Max $\begin{bmatrix} c^T \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \end{bmatrix}$


$$\begin{bmatrix} x \end{bmatrix} \geq 0$$

DUAL LP (Minimization)

$$\begin{bmatrix} A^T \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} y \end{bmatrix} \geq \begin{bmatrix} c \end{bmatrix}$$

Minimize $\begin{bmatrix} b^T \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y \end{bmatrix}$

$$\begin{bmatrix} y \end{bmatrix} \geq 0$$



WEAK DUALITY:

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Any solution to} \\ \text{Primal LP} \end{array} \right) \leq \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Any solution} \\ \text{to Dual LP} \end{array} \right)$$

STRONG DUALITY:

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{OPTIMAL VALUE} \\ \text{OF PRIMAL LP} \end{array} \right) = \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{OPTIMAL VALUE} \\ \text{OF DUAL LP} \end{array} \right)$$

A =

	ROCK	PAPER	SCISSOR
ROCK	0	-1	1
PAPER →	1	0	-1
SCISSOR	-1	1	0

ROW PLAYER

COLUMN PLAYER

* Picks a row r

* Picks a column c

ROW PLAYER WINS $A[r, c]$ \$

COLUMN PLAYER LOSES $A[r, c]$ \$

VALUE OF Ξ GAME = PAYOFF of ROW PLAYER if all play optimally.

GAME A

* ROW PLAYER ANNOUNCES
ROW r

* COLUMN PLAYER RESPONDS

	1	2
1	20	-30
2	10	40

GAME B

* COLUMN PLAYER ANNOUNCES
COLUMN c

* ROW PLAYER RESPONDS

$$\text{Max}_{\text{row } r} \left[\text{Min}_{\text{column } c} A[r, c] \right]$$

$$= \text{Max} \left[\text{Min}_c A[1, c], \text{Min}_c A[2, c] \right]$$

$$= \text{Max} [10, -30] = 10$$

$$\text{Min}_{\text{column } c} \left[\text{Max}_{\text{row } r} A[r, c] \right]$$

$$= \text{Min} \left[\text{Max}_r A[r, 1], \text{Max}_r A[r, 2] \right]$$

$$= \text{Min} [20, 40] = 20$$

STRATEGIES:

PURE STRATEGY : Player picks a particular row
or column

MIXED STRATEGY : Player picks a probability distribution
over rows / columns

$$\text{Ex: } \Pr[\text{row}=1] = \frac{1}{2}, \Pr[\text{row}=2] = \frac{1}{2}$$

PAYOFF : Expected payoff of the player

GAME A

* ROW PLAYER ANNOUNCES
a mixed strategy

* COLUMN PLAYER RESPONDS

with a mixed strategy.

		1	2
1		20	-30
2		10	40

Example: Row player: $\Pr(\text{row}=1) = \frac{1}{4}$ $\Pr(\text{row}=2) = \frac{3}{4}$

Column player: $\Pr(c=1) = \frac{2}{3}$ $\Pr(c=2) = \frac{1}{3}$

Expected Payoff

$$= A[1,1] \cdot \left(\frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{2}{3}\right) + A[1,2] \cdot \left(\frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{3}\right)$$

$$+ A[2,1] \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{2}{3}\right) + A[2,2] \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{3}\right)$$

GAME A:

* Row player plays
mixed strategy P

* COLUMN PLAYER responds
mixed strategy q

		1	2
1		20	10
2		10	-30

GAME B

* COLUMN PLAYER plays
mixed strategy q

* Row PLAYER responds
mixed strategy P

If $P = (p_1, p_2)$ $q = (q_1, q_2)$

EXPECTED PAYOFF $E[P, q] = p_1 \cdot q_1 \cdot A[1,1] + p_1 \cdot q_2 \cdot A[1,2] + p_2 \cdot q_1 \cdot A[2,1] + p_2 \cdot q_2 \cdot A[2,2]$.

VALUE OF GAME:

Max $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text{Min} \\ q \end{array} E[p, q] \right]$

(LP)

A

Min $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text{Max} \\ p \end{array} E[p, q] \right]$

Max $\left[\begin{array}{c} \text{Min} \\ p \end{array} E[p, q] \right]$

(LP*)

B

* LP & LP* are dual of each other.

By strong duality,

$$\text{OPT(LP)} = \text{OPT(LP}^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{Value of} \\ \text{Game A} \end{array} = \begin{array}{l} \text{Value of} \\ \text{Game B} \end{array}$$

\Rightarrow Order of play doesn't matter (with mixed strategies)

WRITING LP for VALUE OF A ZERO-SUM GAME

GAME A:

* Row player plays

mixed strategy P

* COLUMN PLAYER responds

mixed strategy q

	1	2
1	20	10
2	10	-30

If $P = (p_1, p_2)$ $q = (q_1, q_2)$

EXPECTED PAYOFF $E[P, q] = p_1 \cdot q_1 \cdot A[1,1] + p_1 \cdot q_2 \cdot A[1,2] + p_2 \cdot q_1 \cdot A[2,1] + p_2 \cdot q_2 \cdot A[2,2]$.

VALUE OF GAME:

$\text{Max}_P \left[\text{Min}_q E[P, q] \right]$

(LP)

FACT:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{maximize} \\ \text{(ROW, MIXED STRATEGIES)} \\ P_1, P_2 \end{array} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{minimize} \\ \text{(COL MIXED STRATEGIES)} \\ q_1, q_2 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{l} 20P_1q_1 + 10P_1q_2 \\ + 10P_2q_1 - 30P_2q_2 \end{array} \right]$$

$$= \begin{array}{l} \text{maximize} \\ \text{(ROW, MIXED STRATEGIES)} \\ P_1, P_2 \\ P_1 + P_2 = 1 \end{array} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{minimize} \\ \text{(COL)} \\ q_1, q_2 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{l} 20P_1q_1 + 10P_1q_2 \\ + 10P_2q_1 - 30P_2q_2 \end{array} \right]$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \max \\ p_1, p_2, p_1 + p_2 = 1 \end{array} \right\} \left[\min [20p_1 + 10p_2, 10p_1 - 30p_2] \right] \right\}$$

LP

Maximize Z

$$Z \leq 20p_1 + 10p_2$$

$$Z \leq 10p_1 - 30p_2$$

$$p_1 + p_2 = 1$$

||

VALUE OF GAME A

GAME B

minimize

(COL MIXED STRATEGIES)
 q_1, q_2

maximize

(ROW MIXED STRATEGIES)
 p_1, p_2

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} 20p_1q_1 + 10p_1q_2 \\ + 10p_2q_1 - 30p_2q_2 \end{array} \right]$$

minimize

(COL MIXED STRATEGIES)
 q_1, q_2

maximize

(ROW PURE STRATEGIES)
 $p_1=0, p_2=1$
 $p_1=1, p_2=0$

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} 20p_1q_1 + 10p_1q_2 \\ + 10p_2q_1 - 30p_2q_2 \end{array} \right]$$

=

$\min_{q_1, q_2, q_1+q_2=1}$

$$\left[\max \{ 20q_1 + 10q_2, 10q_1 - 30q_2 \} \right]$$

L ∇^*

Min

Z

$$20q_1 + 10q_2 \leq Z$$

$$10q_1 - 30q_2 \leq Z$$

$$q_1 + q_2 = 1$$

$$q_1, q_2 \geq 0$$